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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State presented false testimony during the preliminary hearing, motion to
suppress hearing, and during trial. The State, thereafter, vouched for the credibility of a
law enforcement officer who presented false testimony during these hearings.
Mr. Wheeler asserts he was denied a fair trial and, therefore the matter should be
remanded for a new hearing. Additionally, the district court erred denying his motion to
suppress the forcible blood draw.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
A preliminary hearing was conducted ( R pp.19-20) which resulted in
Mr. Wheeler being held over to district court to answer the charge (R., p.21). The
prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Wheeler by Information with the crime of felony
driving under the influence. (R., pp.17-18.)
Mr. Wheeler motioned to have the result of the forcible blood draw suppressed
because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights to be from unreasonable
search and seizures. (R., pp.40-43.) Mr. Wheeler cited the ISP Video in support of his
motion. (R., pp.40-43.) After noting it had reviewed Mr. Wheeler's motion, the court
conducted the suppression hearing.
Mr. Wheeler's motion. (R., p.48.)

(R., pp.44-46.)

The district court denied

At the pretrial conference scheduled for August 27, 2007, both parties instructed
the court that they were ready for trial. (Tr.0812712007, p.5, Ls.1-4.)

' The State also

informed the district court that it provided a witness list to defense counsel.
(Tr.08/2712007, p.5, Ls.21-23.) Mr. Wheeler's case was scheduled for trial on August
30, 2007. (R., p.58.) The day before trial, the State informed the court that two State
witnesses were unavailable and, therefore, the State needed the court to continue
Mr. Wheeler's trial. (R., p.58.) Not wanting to waive speedy trial, Mr. Wheeler agreed
to move the trial, but continue to have it set within the confines of a timely trial.
(R., p.58.)
Approximately one month later, Mr. Wheeler provided a waiver of speedy trial.
(R., pp.68-69.) Additionally the parties stipulated to vacate and continue the jury trial
because defense counsel had a scheduling conflict. (R., p.70.)
Five months after the original trial setting, the parties again appeared before the
district court for a pretrial conference. (Tr.Vol. I, p.7, Ls.1-4.) The Friday before the trial
the State provided notice to defense counsel that it had three additional witnesses;
Officer McAuliffe, Paul Guthrie, and Richard Bowers. (Tr.Vol. I, p.8, Ls.12-15.) Only
Mr. Bowers testified at the trial. (Tr.Vol. I, p.5, Ls.1-4.) The Thursday before trial,
Trooper Jayne wrote out Mr. Bowers' statement about what had occurred and at the

' There are a number of transcripts.

The Triat Transcript is contained in two volumes.
Volume I includes hearings and trial dates January 28 through January 31. Volume II
begins at page 287 and ends at page 445 and contains the remaining trial and the
sentencing hearing. Mr. Wheeler will refer to the trial transcript by volume number
reflected on the first page of each transcript. The remaining transcripts will be referred
to its hearing date.

trial, spoke with him in the hallway before he testified. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.317, Ls.18-20,
p.319, Ls.12-19, p.319, L.23-p.320, L.1.)
Mr. Wheeler's home site was positioned in Mr. Stukzke's rock quarry. (Tr.Vol. 1,
p.89, Ls.10-23; Tr.Vol. 2, p.289, Ls.22-25.) Mr. Wheeler had the owner's permission to
reside on the property at Highway 200 at milepost 61. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.289, Ls.22-25.)
Mr. Stutzke claimed that Mr. Wheeler was not an employee (Tr.Vol. 1, p.241, Ls.2-3),
yet Mr. Wheeler was responsible for watching the place and keeping an eye on the
quarry (Tr.Vol. 1, p.245, Ls.8-9). Mr. Wheeler owned his own equipment at the rock
quarry (Tr.Vol. 1, p.245, Ls.16-18) and used his equipment to do some excavating for
Mr. Stutke (Tr.Vol. 1, p.246, Ls.13-14). Mr. Stutzke compensated Mr. Wheeler for his
work (Tr.Vol.1, p.246, Ls.10-I I). Mr. Stutzke's rock quarry borders Overman's rock
quarry on both sides. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.289, Ls.22-25. Tr. Vol.1, p.241, L.25-p.242, L.2.)
Overman's manager, Tom Scott keeps the general public out of Overman's rock quarry.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.277, Ls.7, 23-24, p.278, Ls.3-4, p.278, Ls.5-11.)

On April 18, 2007,

Mr. Overman knew that Mr. Wheeler was on his property and was intoxicated. (Tr.Vol.
I , p.229, Ls.21-25.) Mr. Wheeler admitted that he drove his bike on the old highway
owned by Mr. Overman with Mr. Overman's permission. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.354, Ls.19-22,
p.355, Ls.1-12, p.356, Ls.10-17.)
Mr. Stutzke testified that he and Mr. Wheeler had a disagreement on the morning
of April 18, 2007. (Tr.Vol.1, p.244, Ls.13-22.) Mr. Wheeler denied having any contact
with Mr. Stutzke that day, but testified that he confronted Mr. Stutzke's brother that
morning over a compensation dispute. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.328, Ls.17-24, p.329, Ls.21-25,
p.331, Ls.10-I I.) In the afternoon, Mr. Stutzke contacted the police and expressed his

desire to have Mr. Wheeler removed from his property for trespassing because he had
become a nuisance during the weeks leading up to his April 18, 2007 police call.
(Tr.Vol. 2, p.290, Ls.1-3, 11-12.) Mr. Stutzke claimed that Mr. Wheeler was a reckless
driver (not a drunk driver) and wanted him removed from his own property (not the
highway). (Tr.Vol. 1, p.248, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Stutzke wanted Mr. Wheeler evicted from
the property for trespassing. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.249, Ls.4-7.) The state patrol informed
Mr. Stutzke that it would not remove Mr. Wheeler for trespassing. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.249,
Ls.11-12.) Mr. Stutzke claimed he was fed up, wanted Mr. Wheeler removed from his
property, and requested Trooper Jayne to do whatever was necessary to have
Mr. Wheeler removed off the property.

(Tr.Vol. 1, p.249, Ls.12-25.)

Mr. Stutzke

claimed that he informed Trooper Jeff Jayne that Mr. Wheeler was riding his motorcycle
on the highway, had been drinking, and he wanted him removed from the property.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.250, Ls.12-16.)
Overman's employee, Joseph Griffin, witnessed Mr. Wheeler at Overman's rock
quarry on April 18, 2007. (Tr.Voi. 1, p.262, Ls.18-22.) Mr. Griffin observed Mr. Wheeler
drinking vodka during the majority of the day. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.262, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Griffin
didn't recall witnessing any Overman's employee requesting that Mr. Wheeler leave the
quarry. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.263, Ls.8-11.) Mr. Griffin witnessed Mr. Wheeler traveling by foot
and motorcycle during the day. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.263, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Griffin did not witness
Mr. Wheeler ride his motorcycle on the highway that day. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.263, Ls.17-19.)
Mr. Griffin's testimony is consistent with Mr. Wheeler's own testimony at trial. (Tr.Vol. 2,
p.333, L.9-p.334, L.18.)

On April 18, 2007, Overman's employee, James Bristol, contacted dispatch
because Mr. Wheeler was passed out on a pile of rocks in the quarry. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.216,
L.l-p.217, L.2.) According to Mr. Stutzke, Mr. Bristol contacted him and asked if he
could do something about Mr. Wheeler. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.252, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Bristol testified
that due to his personal experience with a friend, he was concerned for Mr. Wheeler's
safety. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.217, Ls.2-8.) Additionally, Mr. Bristol did not want his employer to
be responsible for any of Mr. Wheeler's potential injuries. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.217, Ls.8-11.)
Dispatch advised Trooper Jayne that a witness reportedly observed Mr. Wheeler
driving his motorcycle up and down the highway while he was intoxicated. (Tr.Vol. 1,
p.49, Ls.7-11, p.49, L.22-p.50, L.1.) Trooper Jayne requested Lieutenant Drake to
contact medical to be on scene with their arrival. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.83, Ls.10-13.) Contrary
to his testimony at trial, Trooper Jayne wrote in his police report that he drove with the
ambulance to Mr. Wheeler's location. (Compare Tr.Vol. 2, p.291, Ls.2-5, with Tr.Vol. 1,
p.83, Ls.10-13.)

According to Mr. Bristol, he showed law enforcement officers

Mr. Wheeler's location and discussed with them how the officers were going to proceed.
(Tr.Vol. I , p.218, Ls.11-14.)
Contrary to Mr. Bristol's testimony, Trooper Jayne testified that when he arrived
on scene, Mr. Wheeler's motorcycle was parked (Tr. Voi. 1, p.218, Ls.11-14) and when
he drove by, he observed feet and then witnessed Mr. Wheeler sit up as if someone
would sit up out of a grave (Tr.Vol. 1, p.52, Ls.10-16).

In the police report, Trooper

Jayne did not describe Mr. Wheeler "as if someone would sit up out of a grave."
p.52, Ls. 10-16.)
(Compare Tr.Vol. 2, p.291, Ls.7-11, with Tr.Vol. I,

.2

Mr. Bristol testified that the ambulance arrived when he was speaking with
Trooper Jayne. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.224, Ls.17-18.) Mr. Bristol expressed his concern about
Mr. Wheeler's wellbeing to Trooper Jayne, who then discussed the situation with the
ambulance driver. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.224, Ls.19-22.) After Trooper Jayne discussed the
situation with the ambulance driver, the medical unit left the scene without checking on
Mr. Wheeler. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.224, L.23-p.225, L.2) Trooper Jayne testified the second
day, that because the ambulance viewed Mr. Wheeler conscious in the rock pit they
decided their services were no longer needed. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.198, Ls.3-19.)
After meeting with law enforcement, Mr. Bristol returned to Mr. Wheeler's location
to make sure he was all right. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.218, L.22-p.219, L.2.) Mr. Bristol thought
Mr. Wheeler needed to sleep. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.219, Ls.3-7.) Thereafter, Mr. Bristol went
home without any further discussions with law enforcement. (Tr.Vol. I , p.219, Ls.8-11.)
Trooper Jayne made the decision to sit and watch Mr. Wheeler in hopes that
Mr. Wheeler would drive his motorcycle on the highway and, thereafter, Trooper Jayne
would arrest Mr. Wheeler and the case would be resolved without the necessity of a
trial. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.204, Ls.3-10. p.200, Ls.2-12, p.250, L.25-p.251, L.2.)
After Mr. Bristol checked on Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Wheeler began the process of
starting his motorcycle. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.338, Ls.17-20.) Mr. Wheeler's motorcycle had
difficulty starting, especially after sitting.

(Tr.Voi. 1, p.265, Ls.1-2.)

Mr. Wheeler's bike needed pushed in order to start.

Typically,

(Tr.Vo1. 1, p.265, Ls.3-5.)

Mr. Wheeler attempted to start his motorcycle by pushing it around then jumping on it
and popping the clutch. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.340, Ls.17-24.) Mr. Wheeler testified that he never
drove on the highway that day, but remained only on the private property of

Mr. Stutzke's and Mr. Overman's. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.341, Ls.12-25.) Mr. Wheeler testified
that once he pushed the bike across the highway, he ran beside it, and gained enough
momentum to get it started. (Tr.Vo1. 2, p.342, Ls.14-18.) Mr. Wheeler admitted that he
drove his bike on the old highway owned by Mr. Overman with Mr. Overman's
permission. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.354, Ls.19-22, p.355, Ls.1-12, p.356, Ls.10-17.) Neither
Mr. Griffin nor Tom Scott observed Mr. Wheeler on the highway on April 18, 2007.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.276, Ls.4-6, p.263, Ls.17-19.)
Where Trooper Jayne's vehicle was parked his view to the highway was
obstructed. (Tr.Vo1. 1, p.90, Ls.23-25.) Another police officer staged with Trooper
Jayne heard what appeared to be a motorcycle. (Tr.Vo1. I , p.58, L.24-p.59, L.2.) After
waiting approximately one-hour, Trooper Jayne claimed to have witnessed Mr. Wheeler
move from his location. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.57, L.17-p.58, L.1.) Trooper Jayne testified that he
stepped out onto the highway to try and look down the highway in an attempt to see
something. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.59, Ls.3-7.) He claimed to have seen Mr. Wheeler finishing his
turn out of the rock pit onto the highway and started to head west. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.59, Ls.57, p.59, L.14-p.15, L.I.) Trooper Jayne returned to his vehicle and proceeded to follow
Mr. Wheeler. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.60, Ls.5-7, p.62, Ls.19-24.) Thirty seconds before Trooper
Jayne's lights were activated, the trooper's video recorder automatically began
recording. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.60, Ls.8-10, p.92, Ls.3-7.)
Although Trooper Jayne testified that Mr. Wheeler was in front of him on the
highway, Mr. Wheeler cannot be seen on the video riding his motorcycle until he is
stopped by Trooper Jayne on the privately owned road. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.61, L.23-p.62, L.9;

see also Exhibit ISP video.)'

During cross-examination, Trooper Jayne admitted that

there was a brief moment of time that he no longer had a visual over the motorcycle.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.91, Ls.7-9.) Trooper Jayne was also asked to explain the discrepancy in
his probable cause affidavit and his trial testimony regarding "chasing" Mr. Wheeler.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.107, L.17, p.108, L.9.) In his written report, Trooper Jayne made it sound
as if he was in hot pursuit of Mr. Wheeler down the highway, not that he was staged
some distance away, heard the motorcycle, and allegedly viewed in the distance
Mr. Wheeler driving. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.107, L.17, p.108, L.9.) Trooper Jayne attempted to
explain that the probable cause affidavit is condensed and does not contain many of the
detailed facts in an attempt to assist the court. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.108, Ls.13-22.) When trial
counsel inquired if the accurate information was contained in his incident report,
Trooper Jayne stated that he did not bring the report with him to court. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.108,
Ls.23-25.) When trial counsel provided a copy of the incident report to Trooper Jayne,
the officer admitted that he did not include the information that he was staged, heard the
motorcycle's engine, which resulting in him running out into the road to observe the
motorcycle. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.109, Ls.3, 13-17.) Trooper Jayne eventually admitted that his
omissions of the details in his report would lead a third person reader to believe that he
was traveling down the highway trying to catch up with Mr. Wheeler which is inaccurate.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.112, L.22-p.113, L.2.)
When trying to get Mr. Wheeler location, Trooper Jayne testified that he was
caught by traffic and was unable to get through.

(Tr.Vol. 1, p.66, L.25-p.67, L.2.)

Occasionally, video time is provided to give an estimation to where the evidence may
be viewed on the video. The time reference is reflected of the time viewable on the
bottom right corner of the recording.

Recognizing this misrepresentation, the prosecutor asked Trooper Jayne, "these are
vehicles actually parked on that old section of the highway; is that correct?" to which
Trooper Jayne answered in the affirmative. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.67, Ls.4-6.) Trooper Jayne
wrote in his report that he turned onto a side road and was blocked by two parked
trailers. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.291, L.25-p.292, L.l, p.292, Ls.6-8.) Upon approaching Trooper
Jayne, Mr. Wheeler stopped and, thereafter, was assisted off his motorcycle by Trooper
Jayne and Lieutenant Jim Drake. (Tr.Vol. I , p.67, Ls.6-12, p.68, Ls.3-5, see also
Exhibit ISP Video.)
On cross-examination, contrary to his implied testimony on direct examination,
Trooper Jayne admitted that he contacted Mr. Wheeler on the "old abandoned section
of the highway." (Tr.Vol. 1, p.93, Ls.18-22.)
abandoned highway.

Sam Overman owns the section of

(Tr.Vol. 1, p.230, Ls.3-5, p.277, Ls. 10-13.)

Trooper Jayne

assumed the vehicles belonged to Overman's because they own the north side of the
road. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.96, L.21-p.97, L.3.) Overman's employee confirmed at the trial that
Overman parked his trucks on the abandoned section of highway that he owns. (Tr.Vol.
I , p.230, Ls.6-8.)
Lieutenant Drake testified that he waited in the staging area with Trooper Jayne
for quite sometime. (Tr.Vol, 1, p.234, L.5-8.) He admitted that he could not see the
highway towards the west because of the build-up on the road, but he could see the
highway in front of the driveway. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.234, L.19-p.235, L.I.) Lietenant Drake
testified that he witnessed Mr. Wheeler driving on the highway. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.232, L.22p.233, L.2, p.238, Ls.3.) Lieutenant Drake did not check on Mr. Wheeler's condition

when he first arrived and never witnessed Mr. Wheeler until after the pursuit began.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.235, Ls.18-25.)
Late disclosed witness Mr. Bowers claimed to have witnessed Trooper Jayne
and Lieutenant Drake pursuing Mr. Wheeler. (Tr.Vol 1, p.172, Ls.5-18.) Mr. Bowers
claimed that Trooper Jayne had left the staging area first and was in pursuit of a
motorcycle while Lieutenant Drake remained in the staging area. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.172,
Ls.9-15.) While Mr. Bowers passed Lieutenant Drake, the sheriff vehicle pulled out with
his lights on and passed Mr. Bowers. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.172, Ls.14-18.) Mr. Bowers claimed
to have witnessed the motorcycle proceeding westbound in the westbound lane of
Highway 200.

(Tr.Vol. 1, p.173, Ls.12-15.)

Additionally, he professed to have

witnessed the motorcycle turn into the more westerly of the two entrances to what is
labeled as the old highway. (Tr.Vol. I , p.174, Ls.3-6.) When Trooper Jayne stopped
Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Bower drove by on the actual highway. (Tr. Vol. I , p.174, L.23-p.175,
L.3, see also State's Exhibit Number 1, ISP Video.) Although Mr. Bowers claimed to
have viewed Mr. Wheeler on the motorcycle the same as Trooper Jayne, he denied
observing the flailing arms or Mr. Wheeler nearly tipping the motorcycle over.
(Compare Tr.Vol 1, p.182, Ls.6-12 wifh Tr.Vol. 1, p.191, Ls.18-25.)
During the detention and investigation, Mr. Wheeler showed obvious signs of
intoxication. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.69, L.12-p.71, L.23.) At trial, Trooper Jayne testified that
Mr. Wheeler did not respond initially to the request for breath testing. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.71,
L.24-p.72, L.2.) When asked if Mr. Wheeler ever indicated if he would submit to a
breath test, Trooper Jayne testified that he indicated by not responding and changing
the subject and talking about other things. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.72, Ls.3-8.)

Trooper Jayne testified that after he gave Mr. Wheeler the advisory
requirements, he asked, Mr. Wheeler to provide a breath sample. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.202,
L.20-p.203, L.7.)

Trial counsel asked Trooper Jayne a second time if he asked

Mr. Wheeler to provide a breath sample after he read Mr. Wheeler his advisory rights.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.203, Ls.8-10.) Trooper Jayne again stated that he tried to get Mr. Wheeler
"to cooperate and do standardized sobriety evaluations" after reading the advisory
rights. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.203, Ls.11-14.) Trooper Jayne testified at a previous hearing that
Mr. Wheeler refused to submit to a breath sample.

(Tr.Vol. 2, p.306, Ls.22-23.)

Trooper Jayne testified under oath that there was no question that Mr. Wheeler was not
going to submit to a breath test. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.307, Ls.13-15.) Trooper Jayne testified
that he had no choice except to have Mr. Wheeler's blood drawn. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.307,
Ls.21-24.)
Trooper Jayne read his previous preliminary hearing transcript from May 2, 2007.
(Tr.Vol. 2, p.295, Ls.17-18.) At that hearing, Trooper Jayne testified that he held up the
Alco-Sensor Ill to Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Wheeler turned away and looked away. (Tr.Vol.
2, p.297, Ls.23-25.) Trooper Jayne testified that he felt he could force a blood draw
because Mr. Wheeler refused the breath test and because of the implied consent law.
(Tr.Vol. 2, p.312, Ls.7-11.)
Trooper Jayne made the decision to have the ambulance return to the scene for
a forcible blood draw.

(Tr.Vol. 1, p.72, Ls.18-24.)

Trooper Jayne also made the

decision to perform the forcible blood draw in the back of the patrol car. (Tr.Vol.1, p.73,
Ls.2-2.)

Trooper Jayne indicated that the ambulance driver was a phlebotomist.

(Tr.Voi. 2, p.304, Ls.6-7.) Trooper Jayne removed Mr. Wheeler's handcuffs so they

could have access to his arms. (Tr.Vol. I , p.73, Ls.3-4; Video 18:53:55.) Trooper
Jayne had Mr. Wheeler remove his coat. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.4-6; Video 18:54:20.)
Trooper Jayne held Mr. Wheeler's right arm from the passenger's side of the patrol
vehicle, while Lieutenant Drake held his left arm down from the driver's side of the car.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.6-9.) Ambulance personnel conducted the forcible blood draw.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Wheeler told the officers and the ambulance driver they
did not have his permission to withdraw his blood; they did not have his consent.
(Tr.Vol. 2, p.304, Ls.15-16, Video 18:55:18-18:55:42.)

Mr. Wheeler told everyone to

not draw his blood. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55:18-18:55:42.) Mr. Wheeler would flex his
hand in an attempt to prevent the blood draw. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.310, Ls.10-I I.) This made
it difficult for the ambulance driver to hit Mr. Wheeler's vein. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.310, Ls.1112.) Trooper Jayne did not report a refusal for a license suspension. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.304,
Ls.20-22.) Mr. Wheeler admitted that he was intoxicated. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.344, L.1.) He
recognized that his blood alcohol level was .31 and explained that because he is an
alcoholic and he has a high tolerance level. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.344, Ls.2-7.)
While Mr. Wheeler's leaking blood was being cleaned up, Mr. Wheeler asked
Trooper Jayne what he did. (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06.) Trooper Jayne responded,
"You were driving." (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06.) Mr. Wheeler then asked, "On top of
mountains right?" (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06.) When Trooper Jayne stated, "No out
here on the highway, right?" Mr. Wheeler asked if Trooper Jayne was sure. (Exhibit,
ISP Video 19:06.) Trooper Jayne said "No. Almost sure." (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06.)

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the minor discrepancies in
the officer's testimony should be ignored. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.401, Ls.22-24.) The prosecutor
vouched for the officer by arguing,
There's nothing wrong with Officer Jayne's investigation because there's
some minor inconsistency between something that was said in three
different places. Did you hear anything that struck you as being, the
officer is lying? I mean, everything that the officer said has been
corroborated by the evidence that's been offered to you by the defense.
So think about that. Is he going to risk his career to make this case?

During the trial, Mr. Wheeler apparently was speaking when his attorney was
inquiring of Trooper Jayne. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.105, Ls.5-7.) When Mr. Wheeler didn't seem to
understand, the court again informed him that he was prohibited from talking when the
lawyers were asking questions. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.105, Ls.8-10.) Mr. Wheeler replied with an
affirmative response. (Tr.Vo1. 1, p.105, L.ll.) After one additional question, the district
court excused the jury.

(Tr.Vol. 1, p.105, Ls.17-24.) The district court informed

Mr. Wheeler that he had been cautioned about talking in front of the jury, and he was in
contempt of court. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.106, Ls.7-9.) The district court informed Mr. Wheeler
that it would impose its penalty upon him at the end of the day. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.106, Ls.79.)
After the jury was released for the day, the court proceeded to handle the penalty
for Mr. Wheeler's contempt. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.124, L.13-p.126, L.20.) The court stated the
following:
[EJvery defendant has the right to communicate with his client, but this
defendant is doing so in a manner that is disrupting the progress of the
trial, impeding - I don't want to - it appears to me that it's impeding the
progress of the trial because defense counsel can't concentrate on the
business at hand because of what has amounted to literally pestering by

the defendant. There has got to be a better way to do this. I have seen
trials over 20 years, and people can communicate without this kind of
difficulty.
Now, that's just kind of not so much - I'm not determining the
defendant to be in any way contemptuous by that at this point. However,
it's a warning that he can't communicate his case by his antics, his
verbiage, his body English [sic], and so this has got to be, I think, a subject
- I would recommend it be a subject of discussion.

Trial counsel informed the court that he will speak with his client about the
situation. (Tr.Vol.1, p.125, Ls.7-8.) Then the court went on to discuss a second
contempt,
Now I've held the defendant in contempt. After I did that, and the jury
returned and we were in the process of playing the tape at the request of
counsel, the defendant didn't say any words, but he did some body
English [sic], combined with an unintelligible grunt, which was an obvious
display of frustration with how things were transpiring, in full view of the
jury. And that is the kind of conduct that is not permissible.
If the defendant wants to communicate with this jury, he can waive
his right to remain silent and give testimony at a time appropriate. Now, I
think that this gesture without words is something that can't be caught on
- it might be on the audio. I don't know. It's difficult or almost impossible
in that situation, other than my verbal description. That's why I tried to get
a detailed description of what I saw. It's contemptuous.
I'm going to take under the advisement the penalty for the second
one I'm regarding as a second contempt, and the defendant is going to be
held overnight in the jail as a penalty for the first contempt that I imposed
here previously.
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.125, L.9-p.126, L.14.) Thereafter, the court warned Mr. Wheeler that if he
displayed any further conduct in the presence of the jury, he would be in contempt again
without any hearing on the matter. (Tr.Vol. I,p.126, Ls.8-14.)
At the noon recess on the second day, the district court continued to keep the
second contempt under advisement, but decided not to continue Mr. Wheeler's

incarceration over the noon recess. (Tr.Vol. I , p.221, Ls.2-10.) The court did not enter
a written order after finding Mr. Wheeler in contempt. (See Register of Actions.)
After a three day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict finding that Mr. Wheeler
committed the offense of driving under the influence.

(Tr.Vol. II, p.411, Ls.11-13;

R., p.110.) Mr. Wheeler stipulated that if he were found guilty of the DUI, he would
likewise be guilty of the driving without a license offense.. (Tr.Vol. I, p.78, L.24-p.79,
L.ll.) Additionally, Mr. Wheeler waived a jury trial on Part II of the Information elevating
the DUI to a felony, based on two prior convictions in a two year period. (Tr.Vol. 2,
p.412, L.9-p.415, L.13.)
The district court imposed upon Mr. Wheeler a unified ten year sentence, with
four years fixed, but suspended execution of the sentence and sent Mr. Wheeler on a
rider.

(Tr.Vol.2, p.444, Ls.2-8; R., pp.117-120.)

Mr. Wheeler timely appealed.

(R., pp.121, 126-130.) On August 25, 2008, the district court suspended execution of
Mr. Wheeler's sentence and placed him on probation. (See Register of Actions.)

ISSUES
1.

Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct by continuing to allow the
police officer to submit false testimony and then vouching for the trooper's
credibility in closing arguments?

2.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Wheeler's motion to suppress the results
of the forcible blood draw because it was unreasonable under the circumstances
and Mr. Wheeler revoked his implied consent?

ARGUMENT
I.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct BV Continuing To Allow The Police Officer To
Submit False Testimony And Then Vouching For The Trooper's Credibility In Closinq
Arauments
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wheeler submits that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he allowed

Trooper Jayne to testify falsely without correction. The prosecutor committed further
misconduct by vouching for the officer's credibility in closing arguments. Mr. Wheeler
submits that he was denied a fair trial as a result of the misconduct
6.

Mr. Wheeler Was Denied Due Process And A Fair Trial Because The Prosecutor
Allowed The Police Officer To Submit False Testimonv And Then Vouched For
His Credibilitv In Closina Arquments
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[nlo person

shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S.
CONST.amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .

."

U.S.

CONST.amend. XIV. Additionally, the ldaho Constitution also guarantees that, "[nlo
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." ID.
CONST. art. 1, §13.

Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.

Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 ldaho 18, 19, 576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Prosecutorial
misconduct may result in the denial of a fair trial. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765
(1987).

In State v. Field, this Court articulated the standard by which the appellate courts
review prosecutorial misconduct claims. 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007).
First the prosecutor's actions will be reviewed to determine whether it constitutes
misconduct.

Id. When the defense objects, the prosecutorial misconduct will be

reviewed for harmless error.

Id. When the defense fails to object, prosecutorial

misconduct will first be reviewed for fundamental error, and then if fundamental, the
misconduct will be reviewed for harmlessness. Id. The United States Supreme Court
has deemed this error "false testimony" to be fundamental and to be evaluated by
whether the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the
judgment of the jury. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)).
Recently our ldaho Supreme Court stated:
"Every person accused of crime in ldaho has the right to a fair and
impartial trial," State v. Sharp, 101 ldaho 498, 504, 616 P.2d 1034, 1040
(1980), "whether guilty or innocent," State v. Fowler, 13 ldaho 317, 89 P.
757 (1907). We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that
a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is
submitted to the jury." State v. Irwin, 9 ldaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611
(1903). They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they
can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they
transgress upon the rights of the accused." Id. Prosecutorial misconduct
includes asking questions where the answer is inadmissible, but the jury
can infer what the answer would have been simply from the questioned
asked. Id.
State v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007),
"Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court,
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more
credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9

Idaho 35, -,

71 P. 608, 610 (1903).

The prosecutor's duty is to see that the

defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and avoid presenting
evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury.

Id. The prosecutor must refrain from

deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct by knowingly allowing the
investigating officer to testify falsely without making any attempts to correct the false
testimony and then by vouching for the officer in the closing arguments. The State's
actions in this case denied Mr. Wheeler a fair trial. The prejudice arising from the State
could not have been remedied by an instruction from the trial court and, therefore, the
misconduct was fundamental. Moreover, the State's behavior was not harmless
-I. The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct
A prosecutor's deliberate use of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction violates
due process and denies the defendant a fair trial. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
112-13 (1935). "[Dleliberate deception of court and jury by presentation of testimony
known to be perjured is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice." Id, This
principle has also been applied to include not only a prosecutor's active solicitation of
false testimony, but his failure to correct the false testimony. Alcorfa v. Texas, 355 U.S.

The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including
false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of
ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false
testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of
the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as
the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's
life or liberty may depend.

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). The Supreme Court quoted favorably from
a New York Court of Appeals case providing that:
'It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness'
credibility rather than directly upon defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no
matter what its subject, and if it is any way relevant to the case, the district
attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be
false and elicit the truth. . . .'
Id. at 269-270 (quoting People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887,

136 N.E.2d 853, 854-55).

The United States Supreme Court has extended the

prosecutor's responsibilities to not only correct what he actual knows to be false, but
also to correct what he should have known. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154-55

In this case, the prosecutor's misconduct begins at the preliminary hearing to
have Mr. Wheeler bound over to answer charges, then continues to the suppression
hearing in order to obtain the admission of the forcible blood test results, and then after
receiving the favorable ruling from the suppression hearing the misconduct continues to
obtain a conviction during the trial.
At the preliminary hearing, Trooper Jayne testified that he asked Mr. Wheeler to
submit to a breath test. (Tr.05/02/2007, p.6, L.25-p.7, L.2.) Trooper Jayne then states
that he tried to hold up the Alco-Sensor Ill and Mr. Wheeler would turn away and look
away.

(Tr.05/02/2007, p.7, Ls.4-7.)

Trooper Jayne statement is completely false.

(Exhibit, ISP Video.) After describing Trooper Jayne's version of Mr. Wheeler's driving,
he claimed that Mr. Wheeler's driving "should show pretty good on my video."
(Tr.05/02/2007, p.14, Ls.1-2.)

The only driving that is visible on the video is

Mr. Wheeler being on Mr. Overman's private property. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) Trooper

Jayne admitted that he had not yet watched the video. (Tr.05/02/2007, p.14, L.4.) The
State was in the possession of Trooper Jayne's video that recorded Mr. Wheeler's stop
and forcible blood draw. Thus, even if the prosecutor did not personal know of the false
statements, he should have been aware.
At the suppression hearing, the State continues to allow Trooper Jayne to
present false testimony, without any attempt of correcting the statements. Trooper
Jayne testified, "I read Mr. Wheeler the Idaho 18-8002 advisory form advising him of the
requirements to provide evidentiary testing and the results or the consequences if he
did not.

Then asked him to provide a breath sample, he would not do that."

(Tr.07/25/07, p.1 I,
Ls.12-16.) Trooper Jayne never offered Mr. Wheeler the opportunity
to give a breath sample after reading him his advisory rights. (Exhibit, ISP Video.)

"I

told him that if he would not provide a breath sample that I was going to have his blood
drawn, so he had a choice of doing that or having his blood drawn." (Tr.07125107, p.12,
Ls.9-11.) The video demonstrates that Trooper Jayne never offered Mr. Wheeler a
choice between which tests that he would submit to. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) Trooper
Jayne then stated, "So again I reiterated that he gives the breath sample, we wouldn't
have to do that, and he continued to refuse." (Tr.07125107, p.12, Ls.15-17.) This
testimony is false. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) Mr. Wheeler was not offered a choice between
tests. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) Trooper Jayne also testified that "there was no question
that he wasn't going to provide a breath sample." (Tr.07125/07, p.12, Ls.3-4.) Again,
this is contrary to the video. (Exhibit, ISP Video.)
At trial, Trooper Jayne again presented false testimony surrounding the forcible
blood draw and Mr. Wheeler's alleged refusals to submit to a breath test. Trooper

Jayne testified that after he gave Mr. Wheeler the advisory requirements, he asked
Mr. Wheeler to provide a breath sample.

(Tr.Vol. 1, p.202, L.20-p.203, L.7.) Trial

counsel asked Trooper Jayne a second time if he asked Mr. Wheeler to provide a
breath sample after he read Mr. Wheeler his advisory rights. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.203, Ls.8-10.)
Trooper Jayne again stated that he tried to get Mr. Wheeler "to cooperate and do
standardized sobriety evaluations" after reading the advisory rights. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.203,
Ls.11-14.) Mr. Wheeler's attorney had Trooper Jayne read his prior testimony regarding
the breath test requests. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.306, Ls.22-23, Tr.Vo1. 2, p.295, Ls.17-18, Tr.Vol.
2, p.297, Ls.23-25.) Trooper Jayne testified under oath that there was no question that
Mr. Wheeler was not going to submit to a breath test. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.307, Ls.13-15.)
Trooper Jayne testified that he had no choice except to have Mr. Wheeler's blood
drawn. (Tr.Voi. 2, p.307, Ls.21-24, Tr.Vo1. 2, p.312, Ls.7-11.)
Trooper Jayne never attempted to correct his prior false testimony or explain to
the jury his current false testimony. More egregious is that the prosecutor did nothing
about the false testimony, except attempt to vouch for the officer's credibility. During
closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the minor discrepancies in the officer's
testimony should be ignored. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.401, Ls.22-24.) The prosecutor vouched for
the officer by arguing:
There's nothing wrong with Officer Jayne's investigation because there's
some minor inconsistency between something that was said in three
different places. Did you hear anything that struck you as being, the
officer is lying? I mean, everything that the officer said has been
corroborated by the evidence that's been offered to you by the defense.
So think about that. Is he going to risk his career to make this case?

The prosecutor committed misconduct. Not only did he use false testimony to
get Mr. Wheeler held over to answer the charges, he continued to use the false
testimony to have Mr. Wheeler's motion to suppress denied and then used the false
testimony to have Mr. Wheeler convicted. Then in closing he vouches for the officer.
This Court should find that the prosecutor committed misconduct.
2.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Fundamental Because The United
States Supreme Court Has Determined That Presenting False Testimony
Denies A Defendant Of A Fair Trial

Mr. Wheeler contends that all of the misconduct not objected to constituted
fundamental error. Mr. Wheeler contends that the United States Supreme Court has
held that where the prosecutor uses false testimony during trial, it denies a defendant a
fair trial and, therefore, "[a] new trial is required 'if the false testimony could . . . in any
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury."' Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271). Mr. Wheeler submits that Idaho's
evaluation of whether the error is fundamental is not necessary when the prosecutorial
misconduct claim is that the State used false testimony. The right to have a jury
determine the credibility of each witness, free from impermissible vouching in a case
where the credibility of the victims is crucial, is fundamental. Nevertheless, even under
Idaho's analysis of fundamental error, he asserts that prejudice from the prosecutor's
misconduct could not have been remedied from the trial court instructing the jury to
disregard the comments and, therefore, the errors are fundamental.
An error is considered fundamental where the comments were so egregious or
inflammatory that any prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial

court instructing the jury to disregard the comments. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267,
280, 77 P.3d 956, 939 (2003). The ldaho Court of Appeals has held:
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error when it is
calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse prejudice or passion
against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be
influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence.
State v. Kuhn, 139 ldaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v.
Porter, 130 ldaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997)); State v. Lovelass, 133 ldaho
160, 167, 983 P.2d 233, 240 (Ct. App. 1999)). Furthermore, "[tlhe rationale of this rule
is that even a timely objection to such inflammatory statements would not have cured
the inherent prejudice." Id. (citing State v. Brown, 131 ldaho 61, 69, 951 P.2d 1288,
1296 (Ct. App. 1998)).
It is well settled that a prosecutor in a criminal case "has a special
obligation to avoid 'improper suggestions, insinuations, and especially
assertions of personal knowledge."' United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d
530, 533 (9th Cir.1980) (quoting Berger v. Unifed States, 295 U.S. 78, 88,
55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.M. 1314 (1935)). A prosecutor may not impart to the
jury his belief that a government witness is credible. United States v.
McKoy, 771 F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir.1985). Such improper vouching
may occur in at least two ways. The prosecutor may either "place the
prestige of the government behind the witness or . . . indicate that
information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony."
Roberts, 618 F.2d at 533. When the credibility of witnesses is crucial,
improper vouching is particularly likely to jeopardize the fundamental
fairness of the trial. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th
Cir. 1991).
U.S. v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1998).
In this case, a jury instruction would not have cured the misconduct.

The

prosecutor committed misconduct from the beginning of the case to the end. The
prosecutor used the false testimony to avoid the suppression of the blood test results.
He used the blood test results to discredit Mr. Wheeler's testimony and bolster the

Trooper's testimony. Moreover, he vouched for the credibility of the Trooper at closing.
The misconduct in this case was fundamental and denied Mr. Wheeler a fair trial.

3.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Not Harmless

Mr. Wheeler submits that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was not
harmless. He asserts that the false testimony could have reasonably affected the
judgment of the jury.
Mr. Wheeler submits that this case boiled down to the credibility of Mr. Wheeler
and his assertion that he never drove on the highway when he was intoxicated on
April 18, 2007. He submits that due to the prosecutorial misconduct in allowing, not
correcting, and even vouching for the officer could have reasonably likely affected the
judgment of the jury. The prosecutor successfully defeated Mr. Wheeler's motion to
suppress the blood test results with the use of false testimony. Then, by using the
results of the blood test, attempted to discredit Mr. Wheeler's credibility.
The officer claimed that Mr. Wheeler's driving on the highway would have been
seen fairly clearly on the video.

Then, when the video obviously did not reveal

Mr. Wheeler driving on the highway, Trooper Jayne developed an elaborated excuse of
why it would not show Mr. Wheeler.

Additionally, in the video, when inquiring of

Mr. Wheeler about his driving location, Mr. Wheeler never admits to driving on the
public highway. When Mr. Wheeler poses questions back towards Trooper Jayne if he
was sure about him driving on the public highway, Trooper Jayne says, "No. Almost
sure." Mr. Wheeler submits that he never drove on the public highway. He contends
that Trooper Jayne wasn't sure either.

Mr. Wheeler submits that the credibility of

Trooper Jayne was critical and this misconduct that occurred in this case was not
harmless.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wheeler's Motion To Suppress The Results
Of The Forcible Blood Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The Circumstances
And Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied Consent
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wheeler respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's

motion to suppress order for three reasons.

First, the forcible blood draw was

unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Second, Mr. Wheeler revoked his
implied consent. Third, the prosecutor committed misconduct in allowing Trooper Jayne
to present false testimony, fails to correct the false testimony, and thereafter fails to
correct the court's reliance on the false testimony when making its decision to allow the
results of the forcible blood test to be admitted.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wheeler's Motion To Suppress The
Results Of The Forcible Blood Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The
Circumstances And Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied Consent
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I section 13 of the

ldaho Constitution require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.

The

administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of a person and a search for
evidence under both the federal and state constitutions. Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct 1826 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742

(2007). Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall
within a specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant

requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Murphy, 129
ldaho 861,863,934 P.2d 34,36 (Ct. App. 1997).
When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a heavy
burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. State v. Bower, 135 ldaho
554, 21 P.3d 491 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750
(1984); Sfafe v. Curl, 125 ldaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993); State v. Sailas,
129 ldaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 1996)). If evidence is not seized
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered
as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Even when the warrantless search falls within a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement, the search and seizure must still be reasonable in light of all of the
surrounding circumstances. Diaz, 144 ldaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 741. One exception to
the warrant is a search done pursuant to the owner's voluntary consent. Schnecklofh v.
Busfamonfe, 412 U.S. 218, 219, (1974). Mr. Wheeler does not dispute that pursuant to
I.C. § 18-8002, "in ldaho 'any person who drives or is in actual physical control' of a
vehicle impliedly consents to evidentiary testing for alcohol at the request of a peace
officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion of DUI." Mr. Wheeler, however, submits
that the blood test results should be suppressed for two reasons. First, the blood draw
was not reasonable under the circumstances. Second, Mr. Wheeler revoked his implied
consent prior to the blood draw.

1.

Mr. Wheeler's Blood Test Results Should Have Been Su~pressed
Because The Forcible Blood Draw Was Unreasonable Under The
Circumstances

In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant's Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding the peaceful withdrawal of his blood in a
driving under the influence case, stating that:
We thus conclude that the present record shows no violation of petitioner's
right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures. It bears repeating, however, that we
reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of
an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That we today
hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into
an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under
other conditions.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772. The Supreme Court specifically stated that “[lit would be a
different case if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reasonable request
to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resistance with inappropriate
force." Id. at 760 n.4. The Supreme Court also specifically incorporated this Fourteenth
Amendment analysis into its discussion of the reasonableness requirement under its
Fourth Amendment analysis. Id.
In People v. Kraft, 84 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. App. 1970), the California Court of
Appeals, relying upon Schmerber, suppressed evidence of blood alcohol content from
testing of blood drawn where the defendant resisted, two officers grabbed his arms,
forced him to the floor, immobilized him, applied force to hold his arm still so that a
doctor could withdraw blood from his arm. Id. at 283. The Court held that the amount
of force used violated the warnings given in Schmerber and suppressed the evidence.
Id. at 285,

In Sfafe v. Woolery, I 1 6 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989), the ldaho Supreme
Court addressed I.C.
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18-8002(3)(a-d), containing statutory license suspension

penalties of which a person must be informed when arrested for driving under the
influence. Id. at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213. Although the Supreme Court held that the
failure to inform the defendant of the statutory license suspension under the statute did
not result in suppression of the results of consensual blood draw in that case, the
Supreme Court held that "the purpose of warning of license suspension following a
refusal is to overcome an unsanctioned refusal by threat instead of force," "to
nonforcibly enforce the driver's previous implied consent" and "to avoid the violence
which would often attend forcible test upon recalcitrant inebriates." Id. at 372-73, 775
P.2d at 1214-15.

In re Halen, 136 ldaho 829, 834, 41 P.3d 257, 262 (2002), the ldaho Supreme
Court held that "I.C. $$ 18-8002(6)(b) grants an officer limited authority to order medical
personnel to physically administer a blood withdrawal." Id. at 834, 41 P.3d at 262.
Moreover, I.C.

3

18-8002(6)(e)(i) grants medical personnel the right to delay or

terminate withdrawal of a blood sample if "[lln the reasonable judgment of the hospital
personnel withdrawal of the blood sample may result in serious bodily injury to hospital
personnel."
In this case, Mr. Wheeler's forcible blood draw was unreasonable. The officers
used unreasonable force before, during, and after the blood draw. Trooper Jayne lied
about attempting to first obtain a breath sample from Mr. Wheeler. Trooper Jayne
misrepresented the facts about Mr. Wheeler's refusal to take a breath sample. He

immediately made the decision to conduct a forcible blood draw.3 Suppressing the
blood test results in this case will encourage officers to use forcible blood draws when
necessary and not simply as a matter of course.
Before placing Mr. Wheeler under arrest, Trooper Jayne is heard on the video
stating that he is requesting the medical group for a blood draw. (See Exhibit ISP Video
18:30.44 and 18:31:18; Tr.Vol. 1, p.72, Ls.18-24.) After placing Mr. Wheeler under
arrest and before placing him in the patrol car, Trooper Jayne asked Mr. Wheeler if he
was going to give him a breath sample.

(See Exhibit ISP Video 18:31:36.)

This

superficial request for a breath sample was made after the request for medical was
made to return to the area for the forcible blood draw. (See Exhibit ISP Video 18:3018:32.) Trooper Jayne stated that he had a portable breath machine, yet contrary to
Trooper Jayne's testimony he is not seen on the video attempting to have Mr. Wheeler
blow into the machine. (See Exhibit ISP Video.)
After making his superficial request for Mr. Wheeler to submit to a breath test,
Trooper Jayne can be heard telling dispatch that he is waiting for medical for a blood
draw. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:33:54.) Trooper Jayne's comments were prior to reading
Mr. Wheeler the implied consent warning. (See Exhibit ISP Video.)
Trooper Jayne also made the decision to have medical perform the forcible blood
draw in the back of the patrol car, instead of transporting him to a local hospital.
(Tr.Vol.1, p.73, Ls.1-2.) When medical arrived, Trooper Jayne informed the ambulance
driver that the law allows him to hold Mr. Wheeler down to perform the forcible blood

Mr. Wheeler believes that Trooper Jayne's intention by driving with the ambulance to
the rock quarry was to conduct a forcible blood draw regardless if Mr. Wheeler was
going to submit to a breath test.

draw because of the nature of this case. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:50:38.) Trooper Jayne
then obtained hobbles out of the trunk of his car in anticipation of Mr. Wheeler physically
refusing the blood draw. (Exhibit, ISP Video18:51:43.) Trooper Jayne falsely testified
under oath that he offered Mr. Wheeler the choice of either submitting to a breath test or
having his blood drawn. (Tr.07125107, p.12, Ls.9-11.)
Trooper Jayne indicated that the ambulance driver was a phlebotomist. (Tr.Vol.
2, p.304, Ls.6-7.) There was no proof, other than Trooper Jayne hearsay testimony at
the suppression hearing, that the ambulance driver who withdrew Mr. Wheeler's blood
was trained in the procedure of withdrawing blood. (Tr.0712512007, p.13, Ls.13-20.)
Trooper Jayne removed Mr. Wheeler's handcuffs so they could have access to
his arms. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.3-4.) Trooper Jayne had Mr. Wheeler remove his coat.
(Tr.Vol. I , p.73, Ls.4-6.)

Trooper Jayne held Mr. Wheeler's right arm from the

passenger's side of the patrol vehicle, while Lieutenant Drake held Mr. Wheeler's left
arm down from the driver's side of the car. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.6-9.)
Ambulance personnel conducted the forcible blood draw. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.1012.) Mr. Wheeler told the officers and the ambulance driver that they did not have his
permission to withdraw his blood; they did not have his consent. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.304,
Ls.15-16.) Mr. Wheeler told them "No." (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55:14.) Mr. Wheeler told
them not to remove his blood. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55.) He told them "Don't draw
blood" several times. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55:30.) Mr. Wheeler yelled "ouch and told
them several more times to not draw his blood. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55.) Trooper
Jayne lied to Mr. Wheeler telling him that they were giving him a shot to calm him down.
(Exhibit, ISP Video 18:56:21.) Mr. Wheeler claimed that the forcible blood draw hurt

and he told the ambulance driver not to poke him anymore. (Exhibit, ISP Video 1850.)
Mr. Wheeler repeated saying "darn, darn darn" as a sign of releasing agony over being
poked with a needle. (Exhibit, ISP Video 1858.) Mr. Wheeler would flex his hand in an
attempt to prevent the blood draw.

(Tr.Vol. 2, p.310, Ls.10-I?.) This made it difficult

for the ambulance driver to hit Mr. Wheeler's vein.

(Tr.Vol. 2, p.310, Ls.11-12.)

Mr. Wheeler was poked several times with different needles in an attempt to obtain his
blood. (Exhibit, ISP video.) Mr. Wheeler informed Trooper Jayne that he was hurting
his leg restraining him during the blood draw.

(Exhibit, ISP Video

19:04.)

Mr. Wheeler was leaking blood all over the place. (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06:13.)
Mr. Wheeler asks this Court to hold that Trooper Jayne's conduct was
unreasonable. The blood test violated Mr. Wheeler's constitutional rights to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure.
C.

Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied Consent To Submit To An Evidentiarv Test
Trooper Jayne read Mr. Wheeler the implied consent warnings. (See Exhibit ISP

Video.)

The implied consent warnings were consistent with Idaho Code 18-8002.

Under the statute, a person who refused an evidentiary test will have their license
suspended.

I.C. § 18-8002. The Legislature has defined what penalty would be

imposed for refusal. I.C. § 18-8002.
Mr. Wheeler was explicitly informed that if he refused to submit to the evidentiary
testing he would be subject to a civil penalty.

(See Video, 18:44:10-18:45:08.)

Mr. Wheeler was unequivocally informed that he would lose his driver's license, if he
refused to submit to the evidentiary testing.

(See Video, 18:44:10-18:45:08.)

Mr. Wheeler was not informed that he had no right to refuse the evidentiary testing and,

in fact, he was told of the specific consequences, if he refused. (See Video, 18:44:1018:45:08.)

The implied consent warnings are consistent with the constitutional

protections against unreasonable search and seizure. Without a warrant, a person may
refuse; if one refuses the penalty is taking away a person's driver's license, not forcibly
submitting a person to an evidentiary testing without a warrant.
While the ldaho Supreme Court has previously held that, "there is no
constitutional right to refuse" an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration, that holding
was not based on any federal court authority. See State v. Turner, 94 ldaho 548, 552,
494 P.2d 146, 150 (1972); State v. Woolery, 116 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989). In
fact, no federal court has ever squarely addressed whether a suspect retains the right to
revoke his implied consent to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration, under the
Fourth Amendment.
However, federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have
repeatedly held that although a suspect can consent to a search of his person or
property, that suspect retains the right to revoke, withdraw, or delimit his consent at
anytime. See Florida

v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 348 (1991) (holding that a suspect may

"delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents," in the context of
a vehicle search); United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (gthCir. 2006) (holding
that, "a suspect is free . . . after initially giving consent, to delimit or withdraw his or her
consent at anytime," in the context of a stop and risk); United States

v. Sanders, 424

F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); United
States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 907 (3rdCir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the
right to revoke his consent, in the context of a luggage search); United States

v.
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Marshall, 348 F.3d 281 (1'' Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United
States

V.

Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (loih Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a

vehicle search); United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188 (4'h Cir. 1993) (same, in the
context of a luggage search).
Mr. Wheeler asserts that, even if he impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for
alcohol concentration by purchasing a driver's license and driving or being in actual
control of a motor vehicle, he still retains the right to revoke his consent to search under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, especially where the search
involves Mr. Wheeler's "deeply rooted expectation of privacy" against unwanted
intrusions into his body. Accordingly, Mr. Wheeler respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the district court's order denying his motion to suppress as the State failed to
meet its burden to prove that the involuntary blood draw conducted on Mr. Wheeler fell
within any valid exception to the warrant requirement. See State

v. Rodriguez, 156

P.3d 771 (Utah 2007) (holding that the fact that percentage of alcohol in a person's
blood stream rapidly diminishes after drinking stop does not alone constitute a per se
exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement).
D.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Allowinq Trooper Javne To Present
False Testimony, Failed To Correct The False Testimony, And Thereafter Failed
To Correct The District Court's Reliance On The False Testimony When Allowing
The Admission Of The Forcible Blood Test Results
Mr. Wheeler submits that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the results of the forcible blood draw. Mr. Wheeler submits that he made the
motion and identified the ISP video for the court. Trooper Jayne thereafter lied in his
testimony and the prosecutor failed to correct any of the misstatements. The court

thereafter relied on the lies in ruling on its decision to allow the admission of the test
results. To avoid repetition, Mr. Wheeler incorporates herein as if fully argued Section I.
The district court stated:
Mr. Wheeler made it quite clear that he was not going to submit to a
breath test, and so the trooper made a decision at that point to use a
blood draw. And reasonable he gave Mr. Wheeler the opportunity, he
advised Mr. Wheeler if you don't consent to the breath test, we're going to
do a blood draw. Mr. Wheeler indicated he would rather not have a blood
draw, he didn't want a needle used. And the Trooper gave him that
chance of, well, you can always have the breath test. And Mr. Wheeler
refused a breath test as well again, and so he decided to do the blood
draw.
(Tr.05/02/07, p.29, Ls.5-14.) The district courts findings are contrary to the actual
evidence and are based upon false testimony by Trooper Jayne, which went
uncorrected by the prosecutor. (Exhibit, ISP Video.)
Mr. Wheeler submits that the district court erred in finding the actions of the
police officer reasonable in light of the fact that he lied. It would have been more
reasonable and less objectionable to had Trooper Jayne actually attempted to obtain
Mr. Wheeler's breath sample. Trooper Jayne manipulated the situation from beginning
to end and this type of behavior should not be encouraged by this Court. Therefore,

Mr.Wheeler requests that the order denying the suppression of the blood tests results
be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wheeler respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Judgment of
Conviction and reverse this case for a new trial.
DATED this 1 5 ' ~day of April, 2009.
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